How europe became a collection of the worlds strongest powers in the period from the 16th century to

In the course of this power shift, well established clans such as the Takeda and the Imagawa, who had ruled under the authority of both the Kamakura and Muromachi bakufu, were able to expand their spheres of influence. There were many, however, whose positions eroded and were eventually usurped by more capable underlings. Other notable examples include the supplanting of the Hosokawa clan by the Miyoshi, the Shiba clan by the Oda clan, and the Toki by the Saito.

How europe became a collection of the worlds strongest powers in the period from the 16th century to

Posted on March 10, by reflectionsandcontemplations martinlugton In the nineteenth century, Western Europe was the economic powerhouse of the world. Its productive power was unmatched.

This dominance was achieved at some point between andbut pinpointing exactly when is a difficult task. When exactly did Europe pull ahead, and why did this happen?

How did Europe, rather than China, end up ruling the world? The traditional explanation given is a cultural one. It argues that Europeans have or had a way of engaging with the world that was better suited to economic growth, conquest and dynamism.

But there are serious problems with this argument.

Language and learning in 16th-century Europe

For one, it is rather brash to assume that everyone on an entire subcontinent thinks and acts in the same way.

The seventeenth-century Zheng family trade empire, for example, operated ruthlessly and with fierce commercial passion. They captured Taiwan from the Dutch, and drove the Dutch out of many south-east Asian markets. Nor was a desire for luxury the sole preserve of Europeans: Chinese guidebooks on conspicuous consumption actually appeared before those in Europe.

This is a lazy, un-analytical assertion of Western cultural supremacy. His list of crude national stereotypes reads more like inane racial prejudice than insightful economic and historical reasoning.

Our brief survey of the ramshackle evidence for Chinese cultural inferiority suggests that cultural differences alone — real or imagined — are not enough to explain the differences that emerged between Europe and China. Before the European rise to dominance, the basic rules of the economic game were the same for both Europe and China.

Both economies were limited by the productivity of the land. But photosynthesis is inefficient at capturing solar energy, meaning that there was little stored energy that could be accessed later on, except in trees.

With a finite area of land, if more of its area is devoted to one productive endeavour, inevitably, less land can be devoted to others.


An organic economy is dependent for its energy needs upon flows of energy from photosynthesis, without significant access to stocks of energy.

Was this as important as academics like Pomerantz have asserted? The Americas provided an historically unprecedented abundance of resources to Europe. Europeans cultivated land-intensive crops, such as sugar, cotton and timber, allowing them to supply products that were increasingly expensive to produce domestically.

This access to resources made it profitable to expand, increasing production and volumes of shipping, driving down transaction costs per unit and making further expansion worthwhile.

But the economic exploitation of overseas land areas could not solve the fundamental limitations of the economy. Whilst New World silver and resources may have indeed sharpened European Smithian dynamics and given a boost to growth, they could not challenge the limitations of the pre-industrial economy, constrained by the land.

On its own the New World simply enlarged the board, rather than changing the rules of the game. For most of the period between andEuropean and Chinese economies were both locked into this framework of limited growth.

The organic economy could not provide sufficient access to energy to perpetuate industrial processes and growth.

French literature - The 16th century |

This is exemplified by experience in both regions. The Dolgyne blast furnace in Wales, built inonly operated for an average of fifteen weeks a year due to a lack of fuel; by the start of the seventeenth century, Danish iron production had halted because of a lack of available energy.

In China, by the mid-Ming period, timber supplies neared depletion, leading to the change in salt boiling techniques to use less wood and arguably the development of the wok. In the eighteenth century, much of the junk construction trade moved away from the Yangzi Delta, and grasses and dung were burned to avoid using scarce timber.

These examples illustrate the fundamental limitations on energy utilisation, and therefore on economic growth, in both economies while they remained almost entirely subservient to the yearly productivity of the land for their energy supplies.

By the early eighteenth century, areas in both continents were clearly advanced enough to feel the pinch of environmental limitations, yet neither was able to transcend them. In short, up until the eighteenth century, neither Europe nor China had pulled ahead. This still leaves us with three large questions: How were the limitations of the organic economy to be overcome?

How did Europe achieve dominance, and how early can we see the wheels turning? To enable the economy to move beyond organic limitations, a stock of energy was required. The use of fossil fuels, and access to their stocks of energy, represented a move from reliance upon inherently limited flows of energy dependent upon annual photosynthesis to partial dependence on stocks of energy.

This represented a fundamental break with all past economic experience.

How europe became a collection of the worlds strongest powers in the period from the 16th century to

The economy had previously been constrained by the productivity of the land, but this was no longer a restraint upon growth because energy could be obtained from fossil fuels as well.The expansion of Europe in the eighteenth century featured all of the following except. All of the following were among the Italian powers that dominated the peninsula except.

mcauley ap euro timeline. terms. AP Euro Chapter 16 and 50 terms. World War Uno. Features. Quizlet Live.

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The Spanish Empire Habsburg Spain was a superpower and the center of the first global empire in the 16th century. It had a cultural golden age in the 17th century. With the Peace of Utrecht (), Spain, stripped of its territories in Italy and the Low Countries, lost most of its power, and became a second rate nation in Continental politics.

Europe in the early 20th century had known no great war, involving all the Continent’s major Powers, since the fall of Napoleon. Although European society had been transformed in the interim, the changes had made war more difficult rather than impossible, and the underpinnings of the long 19th-century peace had grown fragile.

The name "Sengoku" was adopted by Japanese historians in reference to the Warring States period in Chinese history which preceded the unification of China. Likewise, the Sengoku period in Japan would eventually lead to the unification of political power under the Tokugawa shogunate.

Time Period: 16th century, during the Reformation Importance: Marked the complete separation of England and the papacy Cause/Effect: Henry VII wanted a divorce from his first wife Catherine, but the pope denied it, so Henry VII started the Reformation in England in order to divorce.

Mar 10,  · In the period before , China was a strong economic power – probably the world’s most advanced economy at the time – but by the nineteenth century it had been thoroughly eclipsed by Western Europe.

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